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CHINA’S IMPACT ON BRAZIL’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

[A] Introduction

Since China started its economic reform process in 1978, the country has gradually increased its participation in the global economy. This has contributed to a changed world market context and has impact on development in countries at all levels of development. Recently China passed Japan in terms of economic size and it has thus become the second largest economy in the world. Projections suggest that it will become the largest economy in the world within a foreseeable future. According to one recent projection, China’s GDP in nominal terms would be significantly larger than the US economy by 2050 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). This implies that we should expect China’s impact on the world economy and on the conditions for development in individual countries to continue rising.

This paper analyzes China’s impact on Brazil’s economic development as well as Brazil’s development strategies in the context of a changing world economy and China’s economic rise. 

China’s impact on economic development of different countries and regions in the world is a relatively unexplored subject, but it has been getting more attention in recent years as China’s economy has continued its highly dynamic growth path, even after the international financial crisis that broke out in the United States, which, as the cyclical centre of the world economy, sent shock waves throughout the world. Although China was affected by the international financial crisis, what stands out is the capacity of China to maintain economic growth rates at close to 10 % a year. This, along with the relative success of India and other Asian and developing countries is part of a pattern that appears to be gradually, but with increasing speed, changing the distribution of the global economic product and therefore also the global balance of economic power. At the same time, imbalances in international trade and financial relations further cement the tendency of China’s increasing economic weight and power. Therefore, China’s impact on the world economy should only be expected to grow, and studies that seek to grasp the potential consequences of this development and to analyze how different nations respond to this situation are called for. In this context Brazil is an important case to study, as it is the biggest Western developing economy and the largest economy in the semi-periphery and the Latin American region.

After this introduction the paper discusses methodological issues regarding the analysis of China’s economic impact on other countries emphasizing its impact on developing countries. This leads to the analysis of China’s impact on Brazil’s economic development and development strategies. It focuses on the period from 1999 until 2011 dividing this period up into two sub-periods, namely 1999-2008 and 2008-2011. The choice of 1999 as the starting point for the analysis is explained by the changed panorama that opened up for Brazilian economic development after its devaluation in 1999 as well as by a new awareness in Brazil of China’s growing centrality in the global economy. The new panorama for Brazilian development in 1999 was used constructively and Brazil experienced a successful period characterized by economic stabilization and growth until the financial crisis broke out in 2008 changing the context of the world economy significantly.



Methodological considerations

China’s impact on the development of other countries is gaining increasing academic interest. It is also a controversial issue, or at least an issue that does not command consensus amongst analysts. Some analysts see China’s impact as mainly benign or as mainly negative, or they either emphasize the challenges China poses for Brazilian development or the possibilities that arise for Brazil in its relations to China. Cornejo and Navarro García (2010: 98) take the view that China is neither a problem nor a solution from the perspective of Brazilian economic development possibilities. The emphasis on risks/challenges and opportunities is a useful first methodological device as it asks of the analyst to distinguish between to different forms of potential impact, one negative and one positive, at the same time that it implicitly suggests that Brazil’s own responses and strategies in the context of China’s rise and Brazil’s own development situation is important. Thus, impacts are not automatic. Instead they are filtered through Brazil’s own choices. As Deepak Nayyar (2008: 92-3) argues in a study on the economic impact of China and India on other developing countries the impact ‘will depend on how reality unfolds’ and ‘on the nature of China’s and India’s interaction with developing coutries, just as it would depend upon what developing countries do to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs associated with the rise of China and India in the world economy’. 

There are a number of methodological difficulties in assessing China’s impact on the economic development of other countries. One major difficulty is that a given economic development in a given country, say Brazil, generally can be explained by multiple causal mechanisms and factors. This means, for instance, that it is hard to disentangle how much or exactly what kind of impact can be attributed to China and how much should be attributed for instance to other countries, to Brazil’s own choices in its development strategically oriented actions and to potential constraints on Brazil’s economic development caused by path dependent factors such as foreign debt and the public debt.

In Nayyar’s analysis referred to above, he suggests that it is possible to distinguish between competitive and complementary factors for developing countries rising from China’s and India’s rise. In pointing towards competitive factors, he argues, for instance that it is plausible to argue that other developing countries will experience a negative impact on manufacturing exports from China and India, but that this impact cannot really be proven (Nayyar, 2008: 91). 

In other words, methodological difficulties mean that the present analysis will not be able to prove a certain impact from China on Brazil’s economic development. Instead the approach is to interpret China’s impact on Brazil’s economic development in an analysis that focuses on competitive as well as complementary factors that pose risks and opportunities for Brazil which are addressed by and filters through Brazil’s own strategic choices in producing development outcomes in a path-dependent situation that itself must be addressed by Brazil. Furthermore, the analysis distinguishes between potential or real short-term impacts and long-term impacts.


[A] Analysis

In the analysis I focus on risks and opportunities for Brazil emerging from China’s rise as well as how Brazil responds to these risks and opportunities that are understood in the context of the global economy and of Brazil’s own development situation. The analysis focuses on the period from 1999 and until the present (2011) and seeks to discern developments in China’s impact over this period as well as to discuss potential long-term impacts.

There are a number of potentially relevant factors that could be explored. However, based on empirical knowledge the analysis will emphasize two factors, namely impacts arising from growing Chinese demand for Brazilian exports and Chinese competitive pressures in the manufacturing sector both in the Brazilian home market and in third markets. Apart from these factors, considered of key importance, the analysis will include issues of mutual FDI as well as competition for ingoing FDI, and also cooperation in research and technology. The analysis will also briefly refer to financing issues. The issue of aid is deemed irrelevant in the relationship between the two countries, although the aid policies of the two countries in third countries may in fact have some relevance..

Apart from these directly economic issues, the analysis will also explore Brazil’s national development strategies in order to discuss how it responds to the global context and its own development situation. Finally, the analysis will discuss the relevance of bilateral relations as well as relations between China and Brazil in the multilateral arena as these issues are part of the overall picture of China’s impact on Brazilian development and development strategy.


[B] The Period 1999-2008

Brazil’s financial instability in the late 1990s led the country to devalue its currency in early 1999. Devaluation actually went against the strategy followed from 1993 of using a relatively stable nominal exchange rate as an anchor for prices and as a means to stabilize the economy. However, the experience of financial instability, first in 1994-5 and then in 1997 and 1998-9 showed that the strategy, although successful in terms of price stabilization had not assured overall stabilization due to growing external deficits.

In the development strategies of the 1990s emphasis had been on macroeconomic orthodoxy along with a neo-liberal strategy of economic openness and privatization in which the traditional markets of the United States and Europe along with open integration in Mercosur were strategically prioritized. The realization that Brazil had not been able to lay behind itself the problem of external economic vulnerability that had been the key factor behind economic stagnation and instability between 1980 and 1993 led to some rethinking of Brazil’s development strategy. The Cardoso government in its national development plan 2000-03 put stronger emphasis on relations with South America and the biggest emerging markets including China (Lessa, Couto and Farias, 2009, 95-6). This new tendency was deepened significantly with the advent of the PT-led coalition government that came to power in 2003 with Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva as Brazil’s President.

The Lula government maintained the policy of macroeconomic orthodoxy but redoubled emphasis on export dynamism and economic diversification of trade links with an emphasis on South-South trade and other links. In particular the other BRIC countries and South Africa were singled out as strategically important (Lessa, Couto and Farias, 2009). 

In a similar way, the Lula government also maintained the relative liberal orientation of the government’s in the 1990s. However, it put more emphasis on the potential for the state’s positive contribution to economic development, particularly through strategic planning. This orientation responded to the criticism of Lula’s presidential campaign of the neo-liberal orientation in the 1990s and particularly the lack of a real national development project that the market-oriented openness thinking had entailed. In other words the emphasis on horizontal policies from the 1990s was no longer seen as sufficient. More vertical policies and strategically oriented policies were seen as desirable by the Lula government, which already in 2003 developed an industrial policy document (PITCE) in which industrial policy was understood to be intimately connected to foreign trade and technological policy. The PITCE distinguished between a short-term strategy and a long-term strategy based on the understanding that Brazil first of all needed to stabilize its external accounts and that export dynamism would be an essential component towards realizing this goal. The longer-term strategy entailed strategies for technological development and increased advanced industrial production capacity. In 2008, the industrial policy was further developed in a more detailed approach to production development in which 25 sectors were singled out (Christensen, 2010). As we shall see, the short-term strategy turned out to be quite successful, both due to the virtues of Brazil’s own policies and due to a benign external context in which China’s role was of central importance. However, threats seem to loom over the long-term strategy. These threats have become increasingly evident after the outbreak of the international financial crisis in late 2008. 

In short, Brazil’s development strategy under the Lula government presented elements of continuity such as emphasis on macroeconomic orthodoxy and a relatively liberal orientation in international economic relations. At the same time it also presented elements of change, such as a stronger emphasis on the strategic role of the state in the economy and a growing orientation towards cooperating with other developing countries. 

As the first Latin American country, Brazil entered a strategic partnership with China already in 1993. Amongst other things the two countries signed an agreement on collaboration in research and development in the area of space science focusing on an earth satellites program (Hirst, 2009, 130). However, in practice China was not very central to Brazil’s development strategies in the 1990s. This started changing in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 1999, and from 2001 the two countries have had regular high level meetings (Roett, 2010, 134). Relations became even closer and arguably more strategic in nature during the Lula government (2003-10), and in 2004 China’s leader Hu Jintao visited Brazil’s president Lula and the two countries institutionalized their strategic partnership with the Committee of High Level Coordination, and, reflecting China’s interest in oil imports as well as Brazil’s interest in developing this sector, cooperation between the Chinese oil company Sinopec and Brazil’s part state-owned oil company Petrobrás was initiated, and has developed since that year (Hirst, 2009, 130-1). Amado Luiz Cervo (2010, 30) argues that bilateral relations are seen as strategic by the two governments, and refers to the communiqués issued by Hu Jintao and Lula in 2004 to argue that these relations are ‘based on mutual trust, bilateral trade and coordination of positions in respect of  multilateral policies’.

China joined the WTO in 2001 (Vadell, 2010), and in 2004 Brazil was the first Latin American country to accept China’s status as a market economy (Vadell, 2010, 13; Saslavsky and Rozemberg, 2009, 203). This decision was part of Brazil’s strategy of diversifying export markets, emphasizing South-South trade and it was also part of its new emphasis on South-South cooperation on the international political scene, which was seen both as part of its economic development strategy and as part of its aim of becoming a more central player on the international political scene. There are a number of examples of this new South-South emphasis (see, e.g. Christensen, 2011) which has been particularly visible in international economic negotiations. Amongst these, the negotiation coalition of developing countries, the G20 that emerged at the WTO negotiations in Cancún in 2003, is one of the most significant examples of the cooperation between China and Brazil on the international stage in multilateral trade negotiations. Another aspect of Brazil’s deepened prioritization of its relationship with China related to the Brazilian hope of receiving more Chinese foreign investments. However, Chinese FDI to Brazil in the period between 1990 and 2007 remained at a very low level, just around 0.1 % of FDI entering Brazil (Saslavsky and Rozemberg, 2009).

Brazil’s South-South strategy and its close relationship to China has been controversial in Brazil for different reasons, but not the least due to the weak competitiveness of the Brazilian manufacturing sector with regard to competition from China. China’s entry into the WTO and Brazil’s acceptance of China as a market economy furthermore made it more difficult for Brazil to take trade actions against Chinese exports entering the Brazilian market. This challenge was furthered even more in 2005 when the Multifiber Agreement ended the regime of export quotas provoking difficulties for Brazilian exporters to the US market (Vadell, 2010, 7-10). Chinese competition in the manufacturing sector led to pressures from business for the government to take actions against imports from China (Nogueira, 2007, 2, Saslavsky and Rozemberg, 2009; Vadell, 2010, 18). Bilateral trade relations and rules are clearly of importance for Brazilian manufacturing firms in terms of their market shares in the Brazilian market. Arguably, though, the competition from Chinese manufacturing in Third markets is even more important, and with respect to this issue national level protectionist policies are hardly any help for Brazilian producers.

These pressures were not in vain. Anti-dumping measures have been the preferred tool and have mainly been applied in sectors where Brazil ran the risk of losing a substantial number of industrial sector jobs (Saslavsky and Rozemberg, 2009, 224). The number of trade actions taken against China by Brazil peaked in 1998, 2001 and 2007 (Saslavsky and Rozemberg, 2009, 202), and following the financial crisis in 2008 such actions have been used extensively by Brazil. This has apparently not provoked a cooling in bilateral relations between the two countries. In fact, already in 2006 negotiations between the two countries paved the way for bilateral agreements on some trade restricting measures as well as a memorandum of understanding in the sectors of textiles and apparel products and volunbatry restrictions of Chinese exports in eight main categories (Saslavsky and Rozemberg, 2009, 204-7).

Henrique Altemani de Oliveira (2010, 89) finds that trade relations between Brazil and China should be seen as mainly competitive. Other analysts stress the positive contribution of China to Brazilian development as a market for Brazilian exports of agricultural goods and commodities. Both of these views seem to correspond to reality. In other words, bilateral economic relations can be seen as both a challenge and an opportunity to Brazil.

In a study from 2006, Mauricio Mesquita Moureiro argues (2006, 1) that the challenge from Chinese competition in manufacturing stems from its endowments, high productivity, large economic scale and the role of the government. Antônio Barros de Castro (2009) points to the problem of ‘Chinese prices’ in the manufacturing sector related to low Chinese wages and also stresses that China for this and other reasons is a powerful competitor for other developing countries when it comes to attracting FDI. On this basis, Castro believes that a number of sector’s in Brazil’s manufacturing sector as a whole are doomed to face severe challenges from Chinese competition. This makes him argue for the rethinking of industrial policy and an emphasis on a few competitive sectors such as ethanol, oil and gas. Although these are natural resource based sectors he emphasizes that both sectors need a wide range of services as well as advanced equipment. Contrary to this recommendation of strategic vertical policies, another group of analysts emphasize the need for horizontal policies such as macroeconomic stringency and liberal trade policies based on the views that macroeconomic stringency can help promote improved credit and thus investment conditions while liberal trade policies ensures that national business is kept on its toes in terms of assuring internationally competitive production. It should be noted that although China can be seen as a significant competitor to Brazil in terms of attracting FDI, Brazil has been quite successful in attracting FDI in recent years, largely due to the dynamism of domestic demand.

Arguably, the Brazilian government has combined both of the recommendations discussed above. However, as mentioned, it has also introduced protectionist measures in order to protect domestic production and jobs. It is relevant to note that keeping down import levels is also a useful tool in terms of maintaining a reasonable balance in the current account of the balance of payments, though protectionist policies can also be seen as potentially problematic in terms of the development of international competitiveness and thus export performance of protected sectors.

Development Results
As of 2004, the development strategy of the Lula government as well as a favorable external economic context for Brazilian economic growth started showing promising developments in the Brazilian economy. Macroeconomic conditions had improved and export figures have increased strongly. According to Castro (2009), manufacturing exports were strengthened considerably in 2004, a year where economic growth resumed and the industrial sector enjoyed an 8.3 % economic growth (BCB, 2007). These elements set in motion a positive circle of job creation, increased tax income and reduced net public debt. At the same time the process of reduced poverty and reduced economic inequality remained strong. In the period from December 2003 to December 2008, public net debt fell from 52.4 % of GDP to 36.0 % of GDP (BCB, 2009, 81). Exports rose from approximately US $ 60 billion in 2002 (BCB, 2003) to 197.9 billion in 2008 (BCB, 2009) assuring annual current account surpluses until 2008. Since then Brazil has faced a growing current account deficit. The initial quite positive macroeconomic results were used productively in the sense that macroeconomic stability was coupled with a fall in poverty from 26.7 % of the population in 2002 to 19.3 % in 2006, falling economic inequality (Neri, 2009, 230 and 236) and a major expansion in the ranks of the middle classes. All this assured economic growth, a major expansion of domestic demand, more jobs, a larger tax base etc. According to IBGE, the manufacturing sector produced net job growth of around 1 million jobs between 1998 and 2006 (Saslavsky and Rozemberg, 2009, 196). These and other developments set in motion a growing quest in the private sector for the internationalization of its activities, a development in which the private sector was assisted to some extent by the public sector both in terms of BNDES lending and lending policies (Castro, 2009) and in terms of the overall strategy of economic diversification. One can speak of a productive synergy between the public sector and the private sector in terms of the increasing internationalization of Brazilian enterprises. Segments of the Brazilian industrial sector became increasingly active as foreign direct investors, particularly in South America and Africa (Cervo, 2010). The largest industrial interest organization in Brazil, the CNI (2007, 9-11), describes South America as being of strategic importance to the Brazilian industrial sector in terms of trade and out-going FDI. However, Virgilio Arrães (2010) points out that the BNDES has particularly emphasized support for Brazilian FDI in natural resource based activities such as oil and gas extraction, and he points out that this emphasis follows the more general emphasis on supporting natural resource related sectors present in government policy during Lula’s presidency which Brazil’s WTO negotiation posture of emphasizing the agricultural sector’s liberalization attests to.



Discussing Brazil’s Development Results and China’s Impact
While the government’s development strategies can be seen as contributing to the positive economic and social developments briefly discussed above, it is also true that a positive external environment characterized by global economic growth and the rise of emerging economies such as China and India was helpful. Particularly important was the Chinese market with its appetite for Brazilian exports of particularly soybeans and iron ore and concentrates. These two product categories dominated Brazilian exports to China in the period between 2001 and 2006, and actually the dominance was greater in 2006 than in 2001. Also, on the top five were iron ore agglomerates and wood pulp in 2001 and 2006, with the last category in 5th position was motor vehicles for the transport of persons in 2001, while the last category in importance in 2006 was crude oil in 3rd position (Saslavsky and Rozemberg, 2009, 177). This shows a Brazilian export structure strongly and increasingly specialized in basic goods from agriculture and mining. At the same time, the vast majority of Brazilian imports from China were concentrated in manufacturing with a tendency to be ever more dominated by capital goods, a category that made up 54 % of China’s exports to Brazil in 2007 (Saslavsky and Rozemberg, 2009, 184). This trade composition follows the traditional pattern of North-South trade and clearly favors China considering manufactured exports as more desirable than basic good exports. On the other hand, the dynamic context of the world markets and China’s imports of Brazilian primary sector exports were associated with a considerable improvement in Brazil’s terms of trade directly related to China’s growing imports that made China the largest importer of both metal ores and oil seeds, categories that dominate Brazil’s exports to China as we have seen, as well as plastic materials, textile fibers, wood pulp and paper (Saslavsky and Rozemberg, 2009, 189). Considering bilateral trade prices between 2001 and 2007, Saslavsky and Rozemberg, 2009 (190-1) find a 52 % improvement in Brazil’s terms of trade. This development, while significant in itself, is particularly relevant given the strong growth in bilateral trade in the decade of the 00s. Whereas 1.4 % of Brazilian exports went to China in 1999, against 4.2 % in 2002, China accounted for 6.7 % in 2007 (Saslasky and Rozemberg, 2009, 169) and an amazing approximately 13.2 % in 2009 after the international financial crisis hit in 2008 (BCB, 2010, 118). These figures attest to China’s rising importance as an export market and to its positive contribution on Brazilian export prices in basic goods. Exports in basic goods virtually exploded in this decade, as they rose from US $ 18 billion in 2002 to US $ 73 billion in 2008 (BCB, 2003; BCB, 2009) and arguably were a significant component in Brazil’s growth success as well as in its attainment of investment grade status from private credit rating agencies in 2008 (BCB, 2009, 98). While these positive developments were associated with growing employment and output in the manufacturing sector, overall employment figures improved much more. According to Marcelo Neri (2009, 225) there was a net job creation of around 10 million between 2004 and 2007 alone, and in April 2008, prior to the international financial instability, 52 % of the Brazilian population was classified as belonging to the middle class against 44 % four years earlier (Neri, 2009, 232).

Development results thus seem more positive than one would expect from a mere focus on Brazilian economic growth results during the Lula government. This relates in part to the strengthening of the Brazilian Real. In US dollar terms, income per capita has risen from US $ 2861 in 2002 to US $ 8237 in 2009 (BCB, 2010, 16) and is significantly higher at present in 2011 after strong growth and revaluation of the currency the last two years.

Thus, China’s impact on Brazil’s development can be considered to have been significant and quite positive in the short run at least. I do not suggest that Brazil’s economic developments should be ascribed alone to the Chinese impact. As mentioned, Brazil’s own policies and a number of other contextual factors are also significant, but no attempt will be made in the present study to disentangle the relative impact of China. In fact, I view this as technically impossible as China’s impact cannot be measured precisely in isolation from e.g. Brazil’s own policy response to the challenges and opportunities offered by changing situations and internal as well as external contexts. What can be done, though, is to point to a number of significant factors and analyze their significance.

Although, China’s short term impact on Brazilian development in the 00s up to the international financial crisis in 2008 has been deemed significant and positive on balance in the preceding analysis, a number of criticisms and worries on behalf of Brazilian development raised by analysts are worth considering. Criticisms basically emphasize the observed tendency of Brazil’s increasing specialization in basic goods and the risks of ‘Dutch disease’ related developments that may endanger Brazil’s long term development. Virgilio Arrães (2010) criticizes the growing specialization in basic goods and particularly government policies which he sees as contributing to this pattern. He points out that what Brazil is experiencing is actually a process of de-industrialization, as the industrial sector contributes a falling share of export revenues feeding into an overall unsatisfactory export performance of the country (2010, 206). Similarly, while Brazil has enjoyed economic growth, the level of growth has been quite modest when compared to economic growth in China and India (2010, 202)  He furthermore stresses that the kind of specialization developing in Brazil is particularly vulnerable to international price shocks in primary goods markets, as the one that accompanied the international financial crisis in 2008. In the following, Brazil’s development and its responses to a changing international environment after the international financial crisis broke out will be discussed. 


[B] The Period 2008-2011
The year 2008 as a whole was a year of dynamic economic growth and export growth. However, the international financial crisis, while not affecting Brazil as deeply and for as long as the leading OECD countries, did affect Brazilian development and its prospects negatively. GDP contracted marginally by 0.2 % in 2009 (BCB, 2010) but then rebounded to 7.5 % in 2010. The industrial sector and exports, however, suffered a greater negative impact from the crisis. The industrial sector suffered a contraction of 7.4 %, while exports fell from record levels of 198.9 billion US $ in 2008 to approximately 151 US $ in 2009 (BCB, 2010) as a consequence of the changes in the international economic context set in motion by the financial crisis that irrupted in the United States with the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (Roett, 2010). Brazil’s exports fell to all regions except to Asia, largely due to the continued strong Chinese demand for Brazilian exports. This meant that the Asian region became Brazil’s largest regional export market followed by Latin America in 2009, while China surpassed the United States to become the biggest individual export market with approximately 13.2 % share in Brazilian exports against a US share of 10.3 % (BCB, 2010). Arguably, exports to China therefore worked as an engine of growth and as a contribution to maintaining economic stability in Brazil. However, as Renato Bauman rightly points out (Bauman, 2010, 42-3), the implication of this development is that Brazil’s export profile tends towards re-primarization as Brazilian exports, a tendency that has been underway throughout the decade of the 00s due to low export levels to the United States, and a low and falling share of manufactures in exports to Europe and Asia. All in all, manufacturing exports had fallen to a share of 44.0 % in the export bill in 2009 against 59.1 % in 2000 and 54.7 % in 2002, the last year before Lula became President (Arrães, 2010, 205). The implication of depressed external markets and re-primarization of Brazilian exports as well as the difficulties of re-igniting stable economic growth in leading industrial countries has been a strengthened Brazilian currency, particularly when compared to the US dollar and the Chinese Yuan, and this development means that Brazil has come to face an increase in the competitive pressure in its export markets and in import competing sectors of the domestic market (Bauman, 2010, 52. This implies an increase in the challenge of competitiveness vis-à-vis the Chinese manufacturing sector, both in Brazil, in the Chinese market and in third markets.

This challenge becomes quite clear when one looks at statistics on the composition of global manufacturing exports. In this area, Brazil has maintained status quo between 1995 and 2009 with a 0.7 % share of total global manufacturing exports, while China is the big jumper moving from a share of 3.7 % in 1995 to a 15.9 % share in 2009 (Gallagher, 2010, 5). Gallagher (2010, 6) estimates that as much as 84 % of Brazilian manufacturing exports are under ‘threat’ from China. He distinguishes between direct (30 %) and partial (54 %) threat, where direct threat happens in products where Brazil’s share is decreasing while China’s share is increasing, both in the home market and in international markets, and indirect threat happens in products where Brazilian market share is increasing at a slower rate than China’s.

As noted earlier, however, China’s continued and growing imports of Brazilian exports could be seen as a stabilizing factor in Brazil’s economic development in 2009, and China can then be depicted as an increasingly important ‘engine of growth’ from a Brazilian perspective. Brazil’s relative success in avoiding an overly severe economic downturn in the economy was not only due to China’s positive impact but also due to policies pursued by the Brazilian authorities in order to minimize the downturn. These include increased lending by the BNDES in a context of strong credit constraints as well as other government incentives to production and domestic consumption (Ghosh, Havlik, Ribeiro and Urban, 2009, 12-3) such as reduced sales taxes in some sectors and a reduced requirement for banks’ deposition of funds in the Central Bank (Christensen, 2010). One further positive element was produced with the 10 billion US $ loan given by the Chinese Development Bank to Petrobrás in May 2009 and thereby providing credit to its development of new-found off-shore oil fields in exchange for Brazilian guarantees of supplying China with 100.000 to 160.000 barrels of oil daily (Roett, 2010, 134). Furthermore, whereas Chinese FDI to Brazil had been negligible until 2007 as shown earlier, Chinese FDI to Brazil has followed a steep upward trend since 2010. It is dominated by investments in energy, metal and soybean production (see Gallagher, 2010, 3). According to a recent newspaper article, China invested US $ 30 billion in Brazil in 2010, principally in minerals, oil, soybean production (Maisonnave, 2011). The same article furthermore discusses a mega-investment of US $ 12 billion under preparation by the Taiwanese company Foxconn that plans to produce iPads in Brazil. If carried out, this investment is surely a significant investment in Brazilian manufacturing in an advanced and high value-adding segment of the industrial sector. Though the investor is Taiwanese, the fact that Brazil courts this investment without Chinese criticisms exemplifies Antonio C. Hsiang’s argument that Latin America is “proving ground for a “diplomatic truce” between China and Taiwan’ (Hsiang, 2009, 47). These recent developments in Chinese FDI in Brazil lends one more potentially positive aspect of China as an opportunity for Brazilian development and it counters the criticisms of those analysts, such as Paulo Roberto Almeida (2010), who have criticized the Lula government’s exaggerated and maybe even naïve expectations in terms of Chinese FDI to Brazil. 

China is also an impressive competitor in manufacturing, though, as mentioned above. Thus, it also is a source of significant challenges for Brazilian development. This has provoked worries in the Brazilian business world. The industrial sector has complained about the relatively weak performance of Brazilian industrial production in 2010 where demand for industrial products increased strongly in response to renewed dynamic economic growth and high domestic demand. Again, the government has responded with protectionist policies against China making use of anti-dumping laws for instance in the footwear sector. Initially, Chinese producers creatively got around this policy by exporting via Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, but eventually the government managed to stem these import flows with anti-dumping taxation of US $ 13.85 per pair of shoes allowing Brazilian domestic producers to gain competitiveness in the domestic market (Soares, 2010, 54-5). In a similar though somewhat different way, state support of domestic producers in the industrial sector has been used with the use of a policy that requires that the huge Brazilian state dominated oil and energy company Petrobrás will have to pay up to 25 % above the international price level in its procurement, a policy that is motivated by the strong exchange rate and worries about de-industrialization (Abreu, 2010). This policy will favor the Brazilian shipbuilding industry and domestic oil platform production, for instance, and it is just the most recent example of an activist state policy of reviving the Brazilian shipbuilding industry that has helped raise jobs and production in the sector by a factor of more than 20 since it bottomed out in the 1990s (Verdin, 2010). State activism has been present in a range of sub-sectors within the Brazilian manufacturing sector in order to promote domestic production and job creation in such advanced sectors. An important new development here is accounted for by the military related industry. With regard to this sector, Brazil ratified its new National Defence Strategy in December 2008, a strategy that encompasses the development of domestic production capacity in the area with the help of technological transfer as part of public sector purchases of military equipment (Drumond, 2010).
Brazil’s approach to its weak competitiveness vis-à-vis Chinese manufacturing was mentioned in the Brazilian press during the most recent BRIC summit in China in April 2011. President Dilma, it was argued, would take a tougher stance with regard to Chinese competition and make it easier to pursue anti-dumping policies and safeguard mechanisms (Fellet, 2011). However, while this may protect Brazilian production in the short term, it is not a long term solution to the challenge to Brazilian competitiveness in international markets. China represents a powerful challenge in such important markets for Brazilian manufacturing exports as the geographically close Latin American and US market. China cannot really be blamed for this, though, and even if one was predisposed to such blaming, the solution to the challenge mainly must  be found by Brazil itself, though bilateral negotiations can also be somewhat helpful.

It is important to note, however, that in spite of such protectionist measures and divergence in national interests, the bilateral relationship between Brazil and China seems to be excellent and to be deepening. It has clearly taken on the dimension of a truly strategic partnership. The newest aspects in the development of this partnership were developed in bilateral talks in 2010 and 2011 as well as in talks with the other BRICS partners. After the inclusion of South Africa in the BRIC group, this grouping is now known as BRICS. The BRIC group started meeting at presidential summits in Yekatarinburg, Russia, in 2009, and have since met in Brazil in 2010 and in China in 2011. The group initially focused on coordinating their positions in the G20 group of the world’s leading and biggest economies in order to gain greater voice and influence in the G20 and more generally in global economic governance (Christensen, 2011). In 2011, the BRICS agreed to an innovative collaborative effort between their respective development banks as a way to pave the way for intra-BRICS trade and investments, also by small and medium-sized companies that tend to find it hard to enter fellow BRICS markets (Folha.com 2011). Finally, with regard to the bilateral strategic partnership between Brazil and China, this was further institutionalized in 2010 with the creation of the ‘Joint Action Plan Brazil-China’, a plan that foresees wide-ranging cooperation including in research and development, one example being the planned cooperation in bio-fuels and bio-energy (Haibin, 2010, 188). This kind of cooperation as well as the Earth Satellites program exemplify cooperation in research, development and technology and complete a wide-ranging partnership that includes bilateral trade, FDI, coordination and collaboration in multilateral trade negotiations and more widely in negotiations focused on global economic governance. Taken together these elements indicate that in spite of areas of divergent interests, the bilateral relations between the two countries are truly strategic and, from a Brazilian perspective, highly prioritized in Brazil’s quest for development and greater influence on the international political scene. 


 [A] Conclusion

China presents both an opportunity and a risk for Brazilian economic development. Although China is a source of both negative impacts, or rather challenges, and positive impacts, it is not particularly useful to weigh positive and negative impacts against each other in order to reach a conclusion of how the impact is on balance. This is because economic impacts are not just produced by market mechanisms but are shaped by a political filter. Market outcomes are shaped by domestic political responses and by bilateral relations as well as the relations of China and Brazil on the international political scene such as in multilateral negotiations on international trade rules at the WTO.

Similarly, China’s impact on Brazilian economic development is not only explained by China’s characteristics and policies but also by Brazilian characteristics and policies. Thus, when we look at the period treated in this analysis, it is clear that Brazil emerged from financial instability and semi-stagnation in a highly indebted situation in 1999, whereas China had been through a long period of financial stability and vigorous economic growth. However, in the situation of 1999, China presented Brazil with opportunities and challenges, opportunities for the diversification of its exports and challenges from competition the manufacturing sector in own and third markets. The two countries thus presented convergent as well as divergent interests. In the short term, China’s growing appetite for Brazilian natural resources and the positive impact of this in terms of Brazil’s terms of trade helped Brazil stabilize its economy and even to strengthen both manufacturing production and exports. This situation continued until the financial crisis in 2008, although there was a tendency for the revaluation of the Brazilian currency, the Real, and for strong growth in manufacturing imports to Brazil from China as well as the consequent heightened challenge from the competition of Chinese manufacturing exports in third markets such as the United States, EU and gradually also Latin America. On the other hand, Brazil used its newfound financial strength to pursue research and development in the manufacturing sector. Financial strength also fostered growing internationalization of Brazilian businesses in a close collaboration between the state and the private sector, with the consequent increasing penetration of Brazilian multinationals, particularly in Latin America and in Portuguese speaking African countries, and particularly in natural resource based production. However, these investments also carry Brazilian exports as well as technological and manufacturing elements.

When the financial crisis that broke out in 2008, the environment for Brazilian development and particularly for the manufacturing sector’s international competitiveness started to worsen. Brazil responded to economic stagnation and a fall in industrial output with a number of actions such as the easing of requirements of the banking sector’s deposits in the central bank in order to address problems of scarce credit for the business sector. The government introduced a number of tax reduction schemes as well as pursuing other policies aimed at maintaining activity and domestic demand. These initiatives were useful in assuring a relatively fast recovery, in which domestic consumption as well as growing natural goods exports to Asia, particularly China, played a positive role. However, there were negative impacts from this development as well. Brazil’s currency started revaluing and the trade surplus fell significantly producing rising current account deficits. In response Brazil increased interest rates. However, a strengthened currency and higher interest rates meant a significantly worsened competitive situation in relation to Chinese manufacturing exports. Responding to this situation, Brazil has introduced a number of anti-dumping measures against Chinese exports as well as the government has introduced public procurement policies aimed at increasing domestic demand for Brazilian industrial production. In the short term this helps maintain domestic production for the domestic market. However, it does not counter the problem of the challenges to Brazilian industrial production from Chinese competition in Brazil’s export markets.

This development points to risks that the longer-term impact of China and of Brazil’s increasing specialization in natural resources will lead to de-industrialization in Brazil or at least to an export and production profile in which high value-added exports make up a falling proportion. The reaction of the industrial sector and its organizations has been to pressure for a weaker currency and lower interest rates. At the bilateral level, the North-South characteristic of bilateral trade between China and Brazil was taken up by Brazil’s new president Dilma Roussef at the BRICS summit in China in April 2011, and the two governments are negotiating ways to assure a mutually satisfactory relationship. More Chinese FDI is now forthcoming and presents new opportunities from the perspective of Brazilian economic development.   
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